A Proposed Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Voting Architecture Using Time-Triggered Ethernet by Wernitznigg, Stefan et al.
A Proposed Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Voting 
Architecture Using Time-Triggered Ethernet 
Andrew Loveless, NASA Johnson Space Center 
Christian Fidi, Stefan Wernitznigg, TTTech 
SAE 2017 AeroTech Congress & Exhibition 
Fort Worth, TX 
26 – 28 September 2017 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170010131 2019-08-31T01:46:33+00:00Z
SAE INTERNATIONAL Paper # 2017-01-2111 2/23 
COTS in Manned Spacecraft 
COTS technologies are attractive for 
use in human-rated spacecraft. 
• Reduces development and upgrade costs. 
• Lowers the need for new design work. 
• Eliminates reliance on individual suppliers. 
• Leverages larger knowledge base. 
• Minimizes schedule risk. 
Problem? Hard to meet the high reliability 
and fault tolerance requirements. 
• E.g. 10-9 failures/hour in ultra-dependable systems. 
• E.g. Crit-1, “fly-through” fault tolerance. 
• Studies for Orion showed purely COTS designs  
would result in poor reliability and undue expense. 
Often custom proprietary solutions are needed. 
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COTS in Manned Spacecraft (cont.) 
But the inclusion of COTS technologies 
is becoming more feasible. 
• Greater availability of rad-tolerant components. 
• TMR (Maxwell SCS750), lock-step (ARM R5). 
• Ability to realize fault-containment regions. 
• Growing number of suppliers. 
NASA’s strategy for future spacecraft has 
heavily prioritized using COTS parts. 
• Includes launchers, landers, etc. 
Multiple projects have explored realizing 
safety-critical systems using COTS. 
• Scalable Processor-Independent Design for 
Extended Reliability (SPIDER). 
• Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV) Architecture Study. 
• Evolvable Mars Campaign (lander).  
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Fault Classifications 
All Faults 
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Fault Classifications (cont.) 
All Faults 













see a fault manifest 
in the same way. 
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Fault Classifications (cont.) 
All Faults 













see a fault manifest 
in different ways. 
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Fault Classifications (cont.) 
All Faults 









Byzantine faults are often 
not considered in satellites. 
• Possibility is considered low enough 
to not warrant additional complexity. 
• Impacts of faults are less severe 
(e.g. not taking a picture). 
Manned spacecraft must 
tolerate Byzantine faults. 
• Especially for dynamic mission 
phases with short time to effect. 
• Higher number of “all-or-none” 
events (e.g. deploy parachutes). 
• Failure could result in loss of life. 
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Byzantine Faults 
Byzantine faults can disrupt consensus 
among redundant processors.  
• E.g. on internal state information. 
• E.g. on sensor data. 
• E.g. on diagnosis of system faults. 
Occur at rates much > 10-9 failures/hour.  
• Slightly-off-specification (SOS) hardware. 
• Stuck transmitter – different receivers can 
interpret a marginal signal differently. 
• Time base corruption – messages received 
slightly too early or too late. 
Several architectural approaches for 
Byzantine-resilient systems.  
• Hierarchical – e.g. SAFEbus, Orion VMCs.   
• Full exchange – e.g. Draper FTMP, SPIDER. 
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“Channelized bus” approach 
is common in launchers.  
• Each OBC can only access 
devices on its local bus. 
• Uses full exchanges. 
• Usually designed to be 1FT. 
Examples: 
• X-38 CRV, Ares I, Delta IV. 
Shortcomings? 
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1. Requires separate CCDL for data 
exchange between OBCs. 
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1. Requires separate CCDL for data 
exchange between OBCs. 
2. Often requires external timing 
hardware for synchronization. 
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1. Requires separate CCDL for data 
exchange between OBCs. 
2. Often requires external timing 
hardware for synchronization. 
3. Requires separate interstage to 
meet minimum number of FCRs. 
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1. Requires separate CCDL for data 
exchange between OBCs. 
2. Often requires external timing 
hardware for synchronization. 
3. Requires separate interstage to 
meet minimum number of FCRs. 
4. Requires two rounds of data 
exchange between OBCs. 
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1. Requires separate CCDL for data 
exchange between OBCs. 
2. Often requires external timing 
hardware for synchronization. 
3. Requires separate interstage to 
meet minimum number of FCRs. 
4. Requires two rounds of data 
exchange between OBCs. 
5. Bandwidth limited. 
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An Approach Using TTE 
1FT “switched voter” using TTE. 
• Requires only 3 full processors. 
• Requires 2-3 redundant switches. 
• Devices can connect to OBCs 
directly or via TTE network. 
• Assumes minimum number of SMs 
and CMs are present for sync. 
TTE network used for data 
distribution and sync. 
• Eliminates need for separate CCDL. 
• Eliminates need for timing hardware. 
• Bandwidth up to 1 Gbit/s. 
Switches act as interstages. 
• Messages reflected to/from the switches. 















TTE Switch 3 
TTE Switch 2 
TTE Switch 1 
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Failure Assumptions 
End systems may be subject 
to Byzantine failures. 
• May send arbitrary messages. 
• May transmit at any point in time. 
• May send different messages to 
different switches. 
 
Switches are restricted to 
inconsistent omission failures. 
• May not create (nor modify to produce) 
a new “valid” message. 
• May drop or fail to receive an arbitrary 
number of messages. 
• May relay messages asymmetrically – 
some receivers may not get data. 
• Acts as a “trusted sender”. 
 
 
Fault propagation from switches theoretically 
requires dual-correlated simultaneous faults. 
 10-6 ×10-6 = ~10-12 failures/hour 
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SW1 SW2 SW3 
Bus Interface 
RIU1 
K 5 5 
5 
• OBC1 reads a value 
of 5 on its local bus. 
1 
• A fault causes 
OBC1 to send a  
bad value to SW1. 
2 
I want to 
share 5 
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SW1 SW2 SW3 
Bus Interface 




• Each switch 
relays the data 
to all OBCs. 
3 
K, 5, 5 
Final: 5 
K, 5, 5 
Final: 5 
K, 5, 5 
Final: 5 
• Each OBC votes 
the values sent 
from the switches. 
4 
Absent data is not 
included in the vote. 
• Vote could be 
implemented 
in TTE NIC or 
in software on 
the OBCs. 
! 
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5, K, _ 
Final: ∅ 
5, K, _ 
Final: ∅ 






• A fault causes different 
values to be sent to 
each switch. 
1 
• Each switch 
relays the data 
to all OBCs. 
2 
• All OBCs agree 
that no majority 
is found. 
3 


















• A fault causes 
OBC2 to send a  
bad value to SW3. 
1 













5, 5, 5 5, 5, 5 5, K, 5 
• Each switch 
relays the data 
from each OBC 
to all RIUs. 
2 
• Each RIU either: 
1. Accepts the first valid 
value from each OBC. 
 or 
2. Votes the redundant 
values from each OBC. 
3 • Each RIU votes 
the values accepted 
in Step 3. 
4 
Absent data is 
included in the vote. 













5, 5, 5 5, 5, 5 5, K, 5 
• Each switch reflects 
the original data 
back to all OBCs. 
5 
• Each OBC votes the 
redundant values 
from each OBC. 
6 
Absent data is not 
included in the vote. 
• Each OBC votes 
the results from 
Step 6 to diagnose 
faulty OBCs. 
7 
Absent data is 
included in the vote. 
Happening Simultaneously … 
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Questions? 
